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In this paper I shall not deal with belief as a topic in its own right. Instead I shall concentrate on action. At the same time, I shall approach these topics from the perspective of a wider interest in the connection between rationality and language.
The paper starts with terminological and methodological prolegomena, setting out the conflict between lingualist sceptics about animal mentality and their opponents, why it should be resolved from a third-person perspective, and why we cannot set store by Morgan's canon (Section I). Next I discuss the relation of rationality to intelligence (Section II), and dwell briefly on external conceptions of rationality of the kind favoured by biologists and economists (Section III). That animals can be intelligent and rational in such an external sense ought to be uncontroversial. The legitimate controversy raised by question (b) above concerns internal conceptions, according to which the rationality of an action is to be judged by reference to the agent's own perspective, rather than to objective measures like biological fitness or utility. In order to decide whether animals are capable of such internal rationality I turn to the idea of acting for a reason, and to two importantly different accounts of reasons for action -subjectivism and objectivism (Section IV). If acting for reasons means acting in a way that is subject to intentional explanations, then animals qualify. In support of that conclusion I defuse two radical lingualist objections, namely that intentional explanations of animal behaviour amount to an anthropomorphic fiction and that animals cannot have beliefs or desires (Section V). This is followed by an exploration of a more tricky issue, namely whether animals can act in the light of reasons. According to the orthodox subjectivist account of reasons as mental states this would require some kind of self-consciousness. But proponents of the objectivist alternative have produced strong arguments for insisting that reasons for actions are facts; and animals are certainly capable of acting in the light of facts (Section VI). Accordingly, there is a difference between being able to act in the light of reasons and being able to reflect on one's having these reasons. What is more, even the kind of self-awareness required by the latter is arguably not the prerogative of language users (Section VII). The same goes for the capacity to reason, or so I shall maintain in my answer to question (a) in Section VIII. The final section tackles question (c). It pleads for recognizing that even if animals were incapable of acting for reasons, there would still be no grounds for denying that they are capable of acting intentionally.
I. Prolegomena
In dealing with animal action and animal rationality, I shall confine myself to non-human animals (henceforth simply "animals"). I shall also bracket the hotly contested question of whether some animals are capable of acquiring rudimentary linguistic skills. For my wider concern is with the question of whether mental properties and capacities presuppose linguistic capacities. 1 So there is no discussion of pre-linguistic infants or signing apes. In other respects, however, I shall cast my net more widely than is common. I shall not just consider extant species and their actual behavioural repertoire, but also non-extant species and the potential behaviour of non-linguistic creatures, extant, extinct or fictional. For my ultimate aim is to establish whether there are conceptual or a priori connections between the possession of language on the one hand, and the capacity to reason, to act for reasons and to act on the other. In particular, I am concerned with a position which (mindful of the fact that employing ugly neologisms is one way of getting ahead in philosophy), I call lingualism. The lingualist is someone who denies on a priori (conceptual) grounds that animals can have mental capacities at all, or at least mental capacities of a higher order such as understanding, thought or reasoning.
In assessing the tenability of lingualism it is particularly revealing to reckon not just with actual but also with possible creatures and behavioural repertoires of a non-linguistic type. When we consider animals very much like us in their facial expressions, gestures and non-linguistic behavioural patterns, lingualism loses much of its appeal, even in the case of higher mental faculties like reason. The lingualist can have no complaints about this procedure, because he is committed to the idea that for conceptual reasons the possession of language is a necessary precondition of rationality and action, irrespective of what creatures are like in other respects.
I shall approach the question of animal rationality from a third-person perspective. That is to say, there will be no appeal to phenomena -whether mental or neurophysiological -that cannot be manifested in observable behavior even in principle. Such a perspective has been adopted by many prominent lingualists -notably Davidson, Sellars, Brandom and many Wittgensteinians. Yet my adoption of this perspective is not just a concession for the sake of argument. The prevailing renaissance of mentalism notwithstanding, such a perspective is not committed to an untenable behaviourism; indeed, there are good reasons for adopting it.
Our mental vocabulary captures neither genetic nor neurophysiological differences, but differences in the kinds of behavioral and perceptual capacities human beings are interested in. We are social primates by nature. Our languages include mental terms because of our fundamental need to describe, explain, predict and otherwise understand the behaviour and behavioural dispositions of other human and non-human animals, and because of the equally fundamental need to provide such information to other humans. No room here for the inner glow sought by Cartesians, or the neural mechanisms that captivate many contemporary philosophers.
As a result, the criterion for the possession of mental powers and rational powers in a species is not the DNA or even the brain of its members. These only come into play when one proceeds to explaining the ultimate or proximate causes of why these specimen possess the mental powers they do. They do not determine whether the animals possess such powers in the first place. That depends on what members of the species are capable of doing in various circumstances.
Nevertheless a third-person perspective on the question of animal mentality and rationality is opposed by many contemporary philosophers, including John Searle. According to Searle, "behaviour is simply irrelevant" to the attribution of thoughts, because "my car radio exhibits much more intelligent verbal behaviour, not only than any animal but even than any human that I know" (1994, p. 216) .
If one were to trust this passage, one would not envy Searle his company. The production of noise by a radio hardly even qualifies as behaviour. But if it does, it is exceedingly stupid. The car radio fails the Turing test miserably.
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Even to its non-linguistic environment, moreover, it cannot react in an intelligent, i.e., responsive and flexible manner. This is why during a traffic jam, in the midst of a chorus of honking, it is capable of uttering things like "Right now everything is serene and quiet here." It is not the radio that behaves intelligently, but at best the person whose utterances it transmits; and even that very much depends on the station it is tuned to.
According to Searle, the essential prerequisite of thought is the presence of neurophysiological phenomena rather than the capacity for intelligent behaviour.
Suppose we had a science of the brain which enabled us to establish conclusively the causal bases of consciousness in humans. Suppose we discovered that certain electrochemical sequences [XYZ] were causally necessary and sufficient for consciousness in humans. … Now if we found XYZ present in snails but absent in termites, that would seem very strong empirical evidence that snails had consciousness and termites did not. (1994, pp. 215-16) But one can establish that XYZ is the causal base of consciousness only if the phenomenon of consciousness has been identified on independent grounds. Searle dismisses as irrelevant the criteria for consciousness and thought employed not just by lay-people but also by cognitive ethologists. According to him it is part of the meaning of mental terms that they apply only to creatures with a certain neural outfit. This has the unpalatable consequence that, contrary to Searle's avowed stance, extreme scepticism about animal minds is legitimate, since even the most knowledgeable among us are ignorant about the precise causal base of consciousness and about the extent to which it is common to humans and animals. 2 Searle cannot appeal to supervenience to sideline behaviour. If two creatures were identical in every respect, including not just their overall physical properties but also their connection to their physical and social environment, then supervenience would require that they have the same mental properties. But of course human beings and animals are not identical in this way. The differences between human brains and even the most evolved animal brains are considerable, not just at the morphological level but also with respect to certain neuro-physiological features (see Roth, 1999; Roth and Dicke, 2005) . And there is absolutely no guarantee that the occurrence of a given electrochemical phenomenon XYZ in a wider context C 1 has the same bearing on the mental capacities of a species S 1 as it has in another context C 2 on the mental capacities of a species S 2 . Furthermore, no occurrence of XYZ could possibly show that a completely inert thing is nevertheless conscious.
Searle's emphasis on the brain at the expense of behaviour evinces an encephalocentrism that is rife within contemporary cognitive science and analytic philosophy. What we require instead is a perspective which is both 236 Hans-Johann Glock more naturalistic and more realistic, and more congenial to the theory of action to boot. Mental and biological phenomena reveal themselves only when we go beyond the brain and consider not just the whole organism, but the organism in the context of its environment, in the context of its form of life, as both Wittgensteinians and cognitive ethologists might put it. Mental phenomena as defined by our mental concepts must be capable of being manifested in behaviour. The moot question is whether certain mental features can only be manifested in linguistic behaviour, and whether acting for a reason and reasoning are among these.
Even if one resists the lingualists' negative answer to these questions, one might remain sceptical about crediting animals with acting for a reason. There is an influential methodological principle in comparative psychology which would counsel caution. According to "Morgan's canon", we should only attribute higher mental capacities to a creature if this is the only explanation of its behavioural capacities.
In my view, Morgan's canon is heavy artillery indeed, and I propose to replace it by something more modest. Call it Glock's canon if you please, even though it is in fact more like a hand-gun. We should only attribute higher mental capacities to a creature if this is the best explanation of its behavioural capacities. Like Morgan's canon, this modified principle relies on a (gradual) classification of mental capacities into higher and lower, a procedure which requires explanation and defence. Both can be supplied, I hope, by applying Aristotelian and Kantian modes of thought, with their demarcations between perception, understanding and reason, to congenial distinctions in contemporary cognitive ethology (e.g., Tomasello and Call, 1997) . Furthermore, weakening Morgan's principle in the way here proposed would put paid to a widespread practice or malpractice among sceptics about animal minds. It is common to account for the cognitive achievements of apes and cetaceans by invoking more or less far-fetched feats of associative learning, simply in order to scotch the prima facie compelling suggestion that these animals engage in genuine planning or reasoning (e.g., Povinelli and Vonk, 2006; cp. Tomasello and Call, 2006) . Indeed, some sceptics seem willing to postulate mechanisms for which there is no evidence whatever, and which are perhaps not even coherently describable, for the sole purpose of avoiding the attribution of higher mental faculties.
But even if one abandons blanket methodological principles which militate against such attributions, the question remains whether such attributions make sense in the first place. And it is to such conceptual questions that I now turn.
II. Intelligence and rationality
The first question that needs to be tackled concerns the relation between rationality and intelligence. That relation is important to our debate, since intelligence is a feature that is often granted to animals. Indeed, as we have seen,
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Searle seems even prepared to extend that courtesy to car radios. Intelligence is sometimes equated with the ability to solve problems. Not all problemsolving or adaptive behaviour is intelligent, however. We need to exclude problem-solving strategies which are predetermined either by the genetic outfit of the species or by rigid stimulus-response patterns established in individual specimen as the result of conditioning (similarly Dupré, 1996, pp. 329-30) . Intelligent behaviour, by contrast, is plastic and responsive to altering circumstances, and therefore capable of tackling problems which the subject has never encountered before. Intelligence in this sense is clearly a feature of some higher animals. It extends from problem-solving through trial and error, as with the Cappuchin monkeys in the trap tube task, to the kind of insight and foresight displayed by chimpanzees or Caledonian crows in the fashioning of tools (see Tomasello and Call, 1997, pp. 10-11 & Ch. 3; Kacelnik, 2006, pp. 101-12) .
How is intelligence related to rationality? Both intelligence and rationality presuppose a capacity for flexible behaviour, i.e. adaptability to changing circumstances, as well as for transfers from one context to another. Rationality is sometimes held to go beyond mere intelligence through (see Hurley and Nudds, 2006, pp. 2-3, 19-20) :
• greater abstraction from here and now (sometimes known as decentring).
• greater generality.
• being subject to normative constraints.
In my view this way of distinguishing the two is largely stipulative. As regards the last point, for instance, both the concept of rationality and the concept of intelligence presuppose a distinction between a general capacity and its successful or unsuccessful exercise. We can contrast a subject or agent A being rational with A being irrational. Both epithets presuppose, however, that A possesses the faculty of reason in the first place, rather than being a-rational or non-rational. In the case of intelligence we encounter the same kind of partition. Only intelligent creatures, creatures that possess the ability to behave intelligently, can strictly speaking behave stupidly, namely by either failing to exercise their intelligence in a context in which they are capable of behaving intelligently, or by exercising their intelligence in an inadequate manner.
If there is a clear-cut difference in the established non-technical usage between "rational" and its cognates on the one hand and "intelligent" and its cognates on the other, it would seem to come down to this: rationality requires a capacity for reasoning. In current cognitive science this difference is often glossed instead in terms of a distinction between two kinds of rationality. One contrasts "behavioural rationality", which is a feature of behavioural patterns and capacities that lie open to observation, and "process rationality", which is a special kind of behaviour generating process. 3 In one respect, at least, this contrast stands in need of qualification and correction.
As Ryle (1949) should have taught us, even the most intelligent or rational performances need not be accompanied (and a fortiori need not be caused) by conscious processes of reasoning. Neither premises nor conclusions of a line of reasoning need to cross my mind, not to mention rules of inference. What counts instead is the capacity of the agent A, for instance the ability to justify her beliefs and actions.
Still, there is a fruitful question that the distinction between behavioural and process rationality drives at. It is whether the rationality at issue is ascribable only from an external perspective. Are the behavioural performances of A to be assessed exclusively by reference to external standards of which A is entirely unaware? Or can they also be assessed by reference to A's own perspective, by reference to A's beliefs, desires, intentions and preferences? 4
III. External conceptions of rationality
External conceptions of rationality have recently gained favour in the wake of Darwinist approaches to the behaviour of both non-human and human animals. A's behaviour is rational in this biological or Darwinist sense in so far as it maximizes A's biological fitness. But external conceptions are not the prerogative of modern evolutionary biology. A similar perspective is adopted by Aristotelians and Neo-Aristotelians who take a teleological perspective on behaviour. From this perspective, A's behaviour is rational in so far as it maximizes A's objective well-being or interests, irrespective of A's own goals or preferences. Such an Aristotelian conception may include the production of off-spring as one parameter of well-being, in which case it includes something like biological fitness. But it need not do so; 5 and it certainly includes other parameters, such as health, happiness, contentment, development and employment of one's capacities, etc. What it shares with the Darwinian conception, however, is an external perspective: rational behaviour is not to be judged by reference to A's subjective predilections, but by reference to objective goals. For instance, an agent (human or nonhuman) that employs intricate foraging techniques in order to acquire a constant supply of sweets may maximize the satisfaction of its own desires or cravings, yet doing so may be deleterious to its biological fitness or ultimate flourishing.
Both of these external conceptions of rationality are potentially fruitful. Nevertheless they should not occupy centre stage in a debate about animal rationality and agency. Animals are indisputably capable of Darwinist rationality. And they are also capable of Aristotelian rationality, as long as one grants the minimal assumption that they have needs and are capable of pursuing these needs in a more or less efficient manner. But Darwinist rationality does not correspond to our everyday notion of rationality. There is nothing irrational, for instance, about minimizing one's biological fitness through effective contraception. More importantly, neither Darwinist nor
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Aristotelian rationality requires animals to possess higher mental faculties, or even to be intelligent.
For these reasons, we need to go beyond external conceptions of rationality. A possible first step in this direction is the conception of rationality which underlies "expected utility theory", a paradigm accepted by most contemporary economists. According to this conception, A's behaviour is rational in so far as it maximizes A's expected utility (see Kacelnik, 2006, pp. 89-91) . This approach occupies an intermediate position. On the one hand, it includes a subjective element. At least officially, it makes A's rationality dependent on an efficient pursuit of A's own preferences. On the other hand, these preferences are imputed either by identifying arbitrary goals that A's behaviour seems to pursue consistently, or by ascribing to A substantive interests suitable for creatures of A's kind, a move in the direction of Darwinist or Aristotelian approaches. In neither case is there a commitment to the idea that A herself has adopted certain expectations, goals and purposes, etc.
But it is precisely the possibility of ascribing a subjective perspective to an agent that is crucial to the debate about animal rationality. For as the example of the sweets demonstrates, by contrast to machines, higher animals pursue goals and have purposes of their own. And these goals may conflict with their objective needs. We can ask whether the animal has adopted a feasible, promising or optimal way of achieving its goals or satisfying its desires, independently of whether achieving these goals or satisfying these desires is conducive to its biological fitness, its flourishing, or the consistent maximization of arbitrary objectives.
IV. Acting for reasons and intentional explanation
How are we to capture this internal type of rationality? To provide for the internal standpoint, we need to insist that an agent is rational in this sense if she can perform an action in order to attain a good, subjectively conceived, something she herself wants. In other words, the agent needs to be capable of acting purposively or intentionally, in pursuit of her own goals. The connection with rationality is easily retained, moreover, since intentional actions are standardly equated with actions which the agent performs for a reason. Such actions are subject to intentional or rational explanations, explanations that refer to reasons, things in the light of which the agent acted. In this paper I shall also refer to such actions as "intentional". For talk of "rational actions" would normally be taken to imply not only that the action was done for a reason, but that it was done for good or compelling reasons (in the terminology of Section II, it seems to rule out not just non-rational but also irrational behaviour). At the same time it should be kept in mind that in labelling acts done for a reason "intentional acts" in this technical sense, i.e., acts subject to intentional explanations, I do not want to rule out that as regards ordinary parlance or in other philosophical contexts we should distinguish between things "done intentionally" and things "done for a reason" (on these topics see Alvarez and Betzler in this volume and Hacker, 2007, pp. 211-14) .
The conception of rationality which corresponds to the idea of acting for a reason (aka intentional action) is straightforward enough:
(1) An agent A is rational if A is capable of acting for reasons.
As anyone familiar with the theory of action over the last fifty years will be able to testify, however, the notions of intentional action, of acting for a reason and of a reason are both tricky and heavily contested. For our purposes, we can distinguish two principal ways of spelling out (1), which I shall refer to, respectively, as subjectivism and objectivism.
First, there is an understanding of acting for a reason which can be labelled as psychologistic (Dancy, 2000) , psychological (Alvarez, 2009 ), internal (Stout, 2005 or subjectivist. It goes back at least to Hume, and at present it is epitomized by the Davidsonian orthodoxy in the theory of action (see Davidson, 1980) . According to this subjectivist conception, (2) A is capable of acting for a reason if A's actions are to be explained by reference to mental states of A (beliefs and pro-attitudes like desires and intentions).
Subjectivism normally identifies acts done for a reason with intentional actions, actions which are subject to intentional explanations. It goes on to insist that intentional explanations invoke the agent's beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. And finally it insists that the beliefs and desires invoked in intentional explanations are mental states of the agent -states of desiring or wanting something and states of believing something. This is the point at which it differs from the non-psychological or objectivist position advocated in recent revisionist work in the theory of action. According to this account, the reasons for which agents act are not mental states of the agent herself. Instead, they are objective facts, facts which, save for special cases, concern the agent's environment rather than her own mind. In so far as the reasons for which an agent acts can be said to be beliefs and desires at all, they are not subjective states of believing or desiring, but what is believed or what is desired. Alternatively, objectivists can insist that the only reasons are facts which the agent is aware of (e.g., Hyman, 1999 There are important differences within the objectivist camp. For instance, I follow the majority of revisionists in denying not just that the reasons for which an agent acts are the internal causes of her actions but also that intentional explanations are causal explanations. By contrast, some revisionists accept the Davidsonian position with respect to intentional explanations and do not adopt a hermeneutic distinction between causal explanation and the understanding of intentional action (e.g., Hornsby, 1997, pp. 129-53) . Nevertheless, objectivists tend to agree on two points. First, A's reasons for F-ing is something that makes F-ing good or valuable in A's eyes; secondly, what makes F-ing good or valuable in A's eye is (by and large) not A's believing something to be the case, but what is believed to be the case. My reason for F-ing is what I specify in response to the question "Why are you F-ing?"; and this answer typically takes the form "Because p" rather than "Because I believe that p". My reason for taking an umbrella is that it is raining, not that I believe that it is raining; for it is the weather rather than my own mental state that makes taking an umbrella good or bad in my eyes.
The subjectivist position is often defended by appeal to Williams' distinction (1981, pp. 101-13) between "motivating" and "justifying reasons": whereas the latter are conceded to be facts, the former are held to be mental states after all. But if the "motivating" reasons for which people act and the "justifying" reasons they have for acting belonged to distinct ontological categories, agents could not possibly act for a reason there is for them to act, which is absurd (Dancy, 2000, Ch. 5) .
Another defence of subjectivism appeals to error cases, cases in which agents have false beliefs. In such cases the reasons for which agents act cannot be facts, since there are no such facts. Instead, subjectivists insist, these reasons must include the agent's mental state of (falsely) believing. From this they infer, moreover, that in the veridical case these reasons must also be mental states of (truly) believing. Yet this automatic inference from the error to the veridical case is just as problematic concerning intentional action as the analogous argument from illusion concerning perception. Hence there is room for disjunctive accounts of reasons for action (e.g., Stoutland, 1998) . Furthermore, one could maintain that in error cases there are no reasons for which the agent acts, but only apparent reasons (Alvarez, 2010, Ch. 5) . Finally, to mention my favourite option, one could insist that even in error cases the reasons for acting are what is believed rather than states of believing, namely possible states of affairs, states of affairs which obtain in the veridical and do not obtain in the error case. This is not the place to develop and defend a watertight version of objectivism. What matters for present purposes are two points: first, there are 242 Hans-Johann Glock noteworthy reasons for adopting such an account; secondly, such an account removes an important obstacle to crediting animals with the capacity to act for reasons. Before exploiting this second point (in Section VI), however, we need to consider whether animal behaviour is a fitting subject of intentional explanations in the first place.
V. Intentional explanation of animal behaviour
Both in everyday life and in science we explain the behaviour of higher animals by reference to their beliefs, desires, intentions, goals, purposes. These psychological explanations are not causal, at least not in the sense of efficient or mechanical causation. Instead they are intentional in the sense explained above, just as our explanations of human behaviour. In both cases we employ intentional verbs, and we explain the behaviour by reference to the fact that A believes that p, desires X, wants to F, etc.
The trouble is, of course, that this practice has been challenged by lingualists. Some of them reject it outright. Others grant the legitimacy of the practice, provided that it is understood as a potentially misleading yet useful or even indispensable façon de parler. In the present context I cannot dwell on these details. Instead I shall consider some prominent lingualist arguments that purport to show that we cannot take intentional explanations of animal behaviour at face value.
The standard lingualist reproach is that of anthropomorphism. Taking intentional explanations of animal behaviour literally, the story goes, amounts to reading human traits and abilities into phenomena where they have no place. Indeed, according to Davidson, employing intentional explanations in the case of animals is just as anthropomorphic as employing them in the case of a heat-seeking missile (2001, p. 102).
Davidson's analogy misses the mark, however. We regard attributing thoughts to animals not just as convenient, as he would have it, but as entirely justified. For, unlike attributing desires and beliefs to complex missiles, such attributions are not based on technological ignorance but on a biological insight, namely that the life and behaviour of animals shows them to have both wants and perceptual capacities. Davidson might reply that the alleged insight is merely an illusion of Aristotelian folk-biology, since animal behaviour could be fully explained by reference to physiological processes, if our knowledge of physiology were sufficiently advanced. However, this invites the question of why human behaviour should resist such explanation. 6 Davidson has a well-known response: human action defies psychophysical laws because it is based on propositional attitudes forming a holistic web. But of course he could not invoke that response in the present context without presupposing that animals, unlike humans, lack propositional attitudes, which would beg the question at issue.
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Admittedly, Davidson has produced a raft of independent arguments to the effect that animals can't "think", that is, have "thoughts" like beliefs (believing that p) or desires (desiring that p be the case).
7 These have been debated intensively for some time now, and they have been found wanting (see e.g., Glock, 2000) . Instead of rehearsing once more the well-known rebuttals of Davidson's lingualism, let me instead produce what I regard as a compelling argument to the effect that animals can have thoughts in the sense explained just now.
My starting-point is the fact that at least higher animals with sense organs are capable of perception. This claim is not accepted by everyone, alas. But it should be accepted as an incontrovertible datum by anyone who is genuinely interested in animal mentality, and in the differences between plants, animals and humans, rather than in merely spelling out the implications of a pet philosophical ideology. Once this starting-point is granted, however, it is well-nigh impossible to deny that animals can think in the sense of believing (knowing, etc.) that something is the case. For seeing is believing, which is to say that a creature that is capable of perception is ipso facto capable of belief. To be more precise, perceiving that p implies either knowing that p, if "perceiving" is used as a success-verb; or it implies merely believing that p, if it is not. 8 In either event, it amounts to a case of thinking that p as defined above.
However, one can distinguish two kinds of perception, fact-perception and object-perception. The lingualist might insist that animal perception does not include perceiving that p, but is confined to perceiving X, i.e. to perceiving objects, persons, situations, events, etc.
9 But this response is implausible. The perceptually guided reaction of complex animals to their environment can only be explained by a capacity to perceive that p. For instance, the dog refrains from grabbing the bone while it lies on the table, something it has been trained not to do; yet the dog grabs the bone as soon as it is placed in its bowl. This action is neither explained by the dog seeing a bone, nor by its seeing a bowl, nor even by its seeing a bone and a bowl. It is only explained by the dog seeing that the bone is in the bowl. The lingualist cannot avoid this conclusion by insisting that the dog simply perceives (sees, smells, etc.) the bone in the bowl. For either the apposition "in the bowl" is restrictive, and simply serves to identify what bone the dog sees; in that case its seeing the bone in the bowl goes no further towards explaining its behaviour than simply seeing a bone. Or "in the bowl" is shorthand for "being in the bowl"; in that case perceiving the bone in the bowl would explain the dog's behaviour. However, perceiving the bone being in the bowl is simply perceiving that the bone is in the bowl by another name. The explanatory power of the ascription can be purchased only by imputing fact-perception, whether explicitly or implicitly. Consequently there is no way around the admission that animals can perceive that something is the case, just as we can. We can summarize this result through the following argument: 
VI. Acting in the light of reasons
If this line of reasoning is sound, there are no grounds for dismissing intentional explanations of animal behaviour either outright or as mere useful fictions. At least in some cases we are entitled to explain that an animal behaves the way it does because it has desires or intentions and beliefs about its environment. If acting for reasons simply means acting in a way that is subject to intentional explanation, by reference to what the agent believes or desires, knows or aspires to, then animals can act for reasons. Nevertheless we have not answered the title question exhaustively. For the idea of acting for a reason can be construed in other and potentially more demanding ways.
Intentional explanations make an action that has occurred intelligible by showing that it made sense from the agent's perspective. Similarly, intentional predictions work by showing that a potential action would make sense from the agent's perspective (see e.g., Bermúdez, 2006, pp. 127-28) . A plausible gloss of this idea has already been intimated (in section IV): intentional explanations imply that the agent can act in the light of reasons. The action makes sense to the agent (as the rational or a rational thing to do), given those reasons. And this implies that the agent is aware of those reasons.
It is at this point that the contrast between subjectivism and objectivism makes a potentially crucial difference. For subjectivism the reasons in the light of which A acts are subjective states antecedent to A's action. In Davidson, for instance, such a reason is a combination of a belief and a pro-attitude towards a certain state of affairs. A's reason for F-ing is A's mental state of believing that p will lead to q, in combination with her mental state of desiring that q. Now, if reasons for action are subjective states of agents, acting in their light seems to require A to entertain thoughts about A's own thoughts. More specifically, it appears to require A to think about or represent its own states of believing and desiring.
10 This implies that in order to act in the light of reasons animals would have to be capable of what Bermúdez (2006, p. 128) calls "intentional ascent", namely a move from thoughts about the world to thoughts about thoughts. To put it more grandly, animals would have to possess not just consciousness of their environment, but self-consciousness, awareness of their own mental phenomena (states, processes, abilities, etc.). The same would hold if the reasons in the light of which A acts were Can Animals Act For Reasons? 245 psychological facts about A, e.g., the fact that A believes that p, desires X or wants to F.
Such self-consciousness may be beyond the ken of animals. That, at any rate, is the view among many otherwise divided commentators (Millikan, 2006; Bermúdez, 2006; Hacker, 2007, Ch. 8) . In Section VIII, I shall challenge this consensus. Right now, however, it suffices to point out that the apparent obstacle does not even arise on the objectivist account of reasons for action. According to objectivism, reasons for action are facts, or at any rate things which are believed rather than subjective states of believing. This immediately removes the threat posed to the idea of animals acting in the light of reasons. For barring extreme scepticism about animal minds, animals are capable of acting in the light of facts, in the light of how things are in their environment. This is just a corollary of their having cognitive capacities. More specifically, as argued in the previous section, animals are able to perceive and hence to believe and know things.
Even from an objectivist point of view, reasons for action are sometimes taken to include not just facts the agent is aware of, but also goods or goalsthings desired as well as things believed. I shall leave aside the contested issue whether any intentional action must include both kinds of reasons, or whether one can make do with the idea that reasons are facts which are good or valuable in the agent's eyes. For neither alternative poses a problem to my claim that animals can act in the light of reasons. That animals possess conative powers is at least as clear as that they possess cognitive powers. This means that they have not just needs of the kind invoked in externalist conceptions of rationality, but also wants, and that they can pursue goods or goals and avoid things. Higher animals have and adopt purposes or goals of their own, namely the goals they pursue, the ends for the sake of which they act (see Hacker, 2007, pp. 130-40, 160-64) . They can also evaluate facts -or, in a more realistic ethological idiom, features of their environment -in the sense of reacting to them as good or bad (e.g., attractive or threatening), and they can act accordingly.
The upshot is that animals are capable of acting in the light of reasons, provided that these are construed as they should be: as objective features of the environment assessable from the perspective of agents.
VII. Reflecting on reasons
Still, there are protests from what, emulating Austin's response to Strawson's account of truth, I am inclined to describe very respectfully as "otherwise sensible quarters". These voices deny that animals can act in the light of reasons, on the grounds that they cannot reflect on their reasons and cannot weigh their reasons within a reflective process. Thus Hacker writes:
there are reasons why animals act as they do, but ... only in the most tenuous sense can we say that they have reasons for acting as they do.
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Only a language-using creature can reason and deliberate, weigh the conflicting claims of the facts it knows in the light of its desires, goals and values, and come to a decision to make a choice in the light of reasons. In so far as non-human animals can be said to decide at all, such animal decision is not a matter of calling a halt to a process of reasoning, of weighing the pros and cons of a course of action and coming to a reasoned conclusion. It is only a matter of terminating a state of indecision. (2007, p. 239) Animals cannot act for reasons because "only language-users can engage in reasoning… deliberate or give reasons." And the reason for this difference seems to be that only creatures which can "give reasons" can "reflect on" or "take account of" their reasons and their behaviour (2007, pp. 204, 236, 240) .
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This picture of human action strikes me as excessively intellectualist and subjectivist. Even we rarely call a halt to a process of reasoning. For the most part we simply make up our minds, without consciously manipulating our own thoughts. But the real difficulty with this lingualist argument is that several of its steps are contestable. We should grant that the power to deliberate presupposes the power to reflect on reasons. But as we shall see instantly, it does not go without saying that it presupposes the ability to justify one's action. Even more problematic is the idea that one can only act for a reason, in response to reasons, if one is able to reflect on reasons, at least if the latter requires the agent to entertain self-conscious thoughts about certain things being her reasons.
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Indeed, MacIntyre has devised a positive argument for keeping the having of reasons separate from reflecting on reasons:
any exercise of the power to reflect on our reasons for action presupposes that we already have such reasons about which we can reflect ... the kinds of reason that we share with dolphins and chimpanzees. Did we not share such reasons with [them] we would not have arrived at that starting point and a denial that we have such reasons would render the transition to specifically human rationality unintelligible. (1999, p. 56; see also Hurley, 2006, p. 143) In short, A couldn't develop a capacity to reflect on A's reasons if A didn't have reasons to begin with.
As it stands, the argument is uncompelling. For one might respond that there is no distinction between a creature that can act for reasons and one that can reflect on these reasons. Without the capacity for reflection and hence (for the sake of the current argument) without the gift of language, an agent cannot act for a reason. Having reasons and being able to reflect on them come as a package, the lingualist could claim, following Wittgenstein's motto that "light gradually dawns over the whole" (1969, p. §141).
But leaving slogans aside, the question remains how this kind of lingualism can do justice to the intermediary stages involved in every dawn. More specifically, how can it do justice to the intentional explanation of animal behaviour? Thus Hacker himself argues forcefully that unlike machines or plants animals can act for purposes, and indeed adopt purposes of their own. What is more, he grants that higher animals are "volitional agents" that can adapt their behaviour to circumstances in pursuit of these purposes (2006, p. 132 ). Yet it is unclear what this could amount to, if such animals could not act in the light of facts pertinent to achieving those purposes. For instance, we explain a well-known behaviour among some chimpanzees by saying that they batter nuts with hard stones in order to, or for the purpose of cracking them. This implies that they act on account of the fact that nuts can be cracked by treating them in this way. Otherwise talk of purposes, etc., boils down at most to imputing the inflexible pursuit of a want through mechanical behaviour.
In fact, however, great apes, at least, are capable of organizing their behaviour in the light of what they perceive, remember, etc., in such a way that they distinguish means from ends, and show awareness of the fact that one and the same end can be achieved by different means and that one and the same means-for instance a tool-can serve different ends, etc. This is precisely what some philosophers and ethologists call "intentional agency" (Tomasello and Call, 1997, p. 318; Hurley, 2006, pp. 148-49) . Legitimately so, and in line with my explanation in section IV, since this is the kind of activity which calls out for intentional explanations. There may be a consistent lingualist stance which ties acting for a reason to the capacity for reflection; yet it seems that it would have to tie an even larger and hence even less attractive bundle, one that includes intentional action as well and thereby lapses into behaviourist accounts of all animal behaviour in terms of stimulus, response and association.
VII. Animal reasoning and deliberation
For all I have argued so far, there may be a case for insisting that in order to act for reasons in the fullest sense, it does not suffice to be responsive to reasons (something well feasible for animals at least on an objectivist construal); the agent must also be capable of reasoning, of operating with reasons. After all, the reasons of fully linguistic creatures are closely tied to how they reasoned, or, mindful of Ryle's attack on intellectualist prejudices, how they could have reasoned. And such reasoning seems to be the prerogative of language users. In this vein, Hacker grants that animals can choose between different ways of pursuing their goals, but denies that they can deliberate or engage in practical reasoning.
As far as I can tell, there are two routes to this negative verdict. One is that reasoning requires self-consciousness; the other is that reasoning is an inner 248 Hans-Johann Glock process that can be ascribed only to subjects capable of expressing it in language.
According to a plausible account, practical reasoning takes the following form (see Kenny, 1989, pp. 43-45) : P 3 X is to be brought about P 4 If I F then X C 2 So I'll F! By contrast to theoretical reasoning, the conclusions of practical inferences are not assertions but resolves or expressions of intentions. This does not count in favour of lingualism. As regards context (problem), demeanour (e.g. head scratching) and result (problem solution), the problem solving behaviour of chimpanzees, for instance, resembles that of human beings. They interrupt an activity, examine an obstacle, pursue a certain solution, discard one type of tool in favour of another, resume their activity in a purposeful and determined fashion. All of this is accompanied, moreover, by gestures and grimaces displaying displeasure, hesitation, resolve and satisfaction. In short, it is perfectly possible for non-linguistic creatures to manifest not just intentions but also resolves or decisions.
A more serious difficulty for the idea of animal reasoning arises from P 4 . It is an 'I thought', which seems to require self-consciousness and thereby language. However, philosophers have always tended to inflate the idea of self-consciousness. This holds not just for those who construe self-consciousness as consciousness of a mysterious separate entity, a self. Ironically, it also holds of those who rightly dismiss this idea as a misguided projection from grammar and instead tie self-consciousness exclusively to the capacity to utter sentences involving first-personal pronouns. But there are forms of self-awareness which are rather more modest, and do not even presuppose consciousness of one's own mental phenomena (states, processes, etc.) , let alone consciousness of a self.
Thus there is clear evidence that great apes, dolphins and elephants can recognize themselves, i.e. their own bodies, in mirrors. There is equally clear evidence that great apes are acutely aware of their own status and role within complex social groups (see Plotnik et al., 2006; Tomasello and Call, 1997, Part II) . Barring a compelling reason to the contrary, this evidence suggests the legitimacy of ascribing "I thoughts" of a simple kind even in the absence of an ability to vent sentences like "If I F then X" or "Let me F!".
The crucial point is that P 4 requires only such simple self-awareness, namely awareness of one's own actions and their consequences. What is more, this kind of self-awareness is already implied by the very idea of intentional action. For behaviour can only be explained by reference to reasons if it is under the control of the agent, and such control clearly presupposes awareness of (Hacker, 2007, pp. 135-36 ). Yet this again implies self-awareness of a minimal kind. Nor should we be all that surprised by the fact that animals can be aware of what they are doing. This is a straightforward outgrowth of kinaesthetic knowledge and essential to the survival of higher animals that need to adapt their behaviour to changing circumstances in an intelligent manner.
Finally, great apes can choose in a deliberate way, i.e., one which is controlled and responsive to the situation (see Glock, 2010) . For instance, chimpanzees choose tools for cracking nuts or hunting insects in a deliberate and foresightful way, often out of sight of the location in which the tool is to be used. Furthermore, as indicated above, this process closely resembles human instrumental reasoning in concrete situations. Therefore we can perfectly well speak of deliberation, if not reasoning, here. Some non-linguistic creatures can weigh the conflicting claims of objective features of the situation, including their own behaviour, and act accordingly. Once more, therefore, radical scepticism appears to be the only clear alternative to crediting animals with powers that many would withhold from them, in this case the power of practical deliberation.
It should also be noted that the problem concerning "I thoughts" does not arise in the case of theoretical reasoning, since the premises of such reasoning need not refer to the reasoner. What does arise is the worry that such reasoning makes sense only as an inner process that the subject can divulge linguistically (e.g., Rundle, 1999, Ch. 4; Kaczelnik, 2006) . Can animals be guided by such an inner process of reasoning?
To answer this question consider the ancient tale of the dog of Chrysippus. In chasing a prey of which it has lost the scent, this dog reaches a cross-roads; it sniffs down the first path, then sniffs down the second path, then it immediately follows the third without sniffing. In the case of dogs, perhaps such behaviour could only be a rigid conditioned reflex. But I can see no reason for denying that this is an intelligible form of behaviour for a non-linguistic creature capable of voluntary action. And if it is, what is wrong with the explanation that the behaviour evinces a disjunctive inference ("p or q or r; neither p nor q; ergo r")? We might grant that there is a difficulty in describing such a creature as silently consulting a principle. But as Ryle has convincingly argued, even the intelligent performances of humans are rarely accompanied by conscious consultations of this kind.
This leaves one final qualm. Although humans need not actually verbalize their reasoning, they are capable of doing so. In the absence of this capacity, the question arises of what in an animal's behaviour could correspond to the "ergo" of linguistic reasoning. This point is unanswerable with respect to creatures like dogs. But in the case of chimpanzees there can be an analogue, however thin, to our "ergo". In the context of encountering and pondering a problem, certain gestures and grimaces, followed by renewed activity, can 250 Hans-Johann Glock naturally be interpreted as marking the point when the penny dropped.
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Even if this is an anthropomorphic interpretation in the case of chimpanzees, we can easily imagine a non-linguistic hominid whose facial expressions and gestures are so close to ours as to make such a description inevitable. According to current wisdom, homo erectus lacked language. But now imagine a homo erectus who proceeds in the same way as the dog of Chrysippus, yet accompanied by suitable grimaces and gestures, e.g., the scratching of heads (which, incidentally, is also a notable feature of chimpanzee deliberation), followed by a sudden smile and the resumption of the pursuit. It would appear utterly dogmatic to exclude explanation of such behaviour by reference to disjunctive reasoning, simply because the agent lacks language.
VIII. Animal action
Perhaps there might be arguments which would show that these accounts of non-linguistic problem-solving are over-interpretations. After all, let's not forget Russell's sobering diagnosis of philosophical conclusions drawn from the observation of animal behaviour. Let us also grant, though exclusively for the sake of argument, that animals cannot act in the light of reasons and that our practice of applying intentional explanations to their behaviour can somehow be debunked. In that case we would have to conclude that animals cannot act for reasons at all. Would we also have to conclude that they cannot act at all, but merely display behaviour? Were the behaviourists right to insist that, at least strictly speaking, all animal activity, however evolved and plastic, ultimately reduces to mechanical reactions? Some philosophers seem prepared to answer in the affirmative (e.g., Stoecker in this issue). But I can see only one point in favour of such a radical conclusion. As Hacker observes, we speak more readily of animal behaviour than of acts animals perform (2007, p. 140) . On the other hand, when we turn from highly general terms like "action" and "behaviour" to specific action verbs, the picture is very different. According to both common and scientific parlance, animals can and actually do many of the things that we do. They forage and search, hunt and kill prey, they eat, court and mate, defend their off-spring, groom, etc. Some of them also play, prepare food, manufacture and use tools, form alliances, fight, make up, etc.
there are not just reasons for which animals act, but that these reasons are "the agent's own reasons" (2006, pp. 142-43) . My notion of internal rationality does not create this difficulty, since it implies that the agent can become aware of her own reasons. 5.
Thus for Hacker "reproductive success" is of "no benefit to the animal"; what counts is only whether a feature "contributes to the animal's successful engagement in activities characteristic of its kind" (2007, pp. 167 and N. 12, 177-78) . It is worth keeping in mind, however, that producing off-spring is characteristic of all living organisms, for reasons that are obvious but have been explored in depth by evolutionary theory. And I see no reason why one should confine the concept of a benefit to the successful pursuit of activities which are specific to individual species rather than shared by all or many species. Indeed, it is arguable that without something like reproduction it would be at any rate more difficult to draw a distinction Hacker rightly emphasizes, namely between inanimate objects and living organisms that have needs. Artefacts no less than organisms require things in order to function. And reproduction is one of the functions, perhaps the central one, which separates the animate from the inanimate. 6.
It should also be pointed out that folk biology is not alone in applying intentional explanations to animals. Cognitive ethology has become a cutting-edge branch of modern biology precisely by overcoming the behaviourist reduction of animal behaviour to stimulusresponse mechanisms. 7.
Like Davidson, I am wary of the idea that these intentional states are relations to propositions (see Glock, 2003, pp. 264-67) . For this reason I avoid the popular terminology of "propositional attitudes" and instead employ "thinking" or "having thoughts" in the technical sense of being in an intentional state. 8.
I have phrased the matter in this fashion because I do not want to commit myself to the idea -enshrined in the traditional definition of knowledge as true, justified belief -that knowing that p implies believing that p. 9.
Intentional verbs occur mainly in three sentential forms:
I A Vs (thinks/believes/expects, etc.) that p II A Vs (intends/plans/means, etc.)
to F III A Vs (loves/desires/thinks about, etc.) X Following this scheme, fact-perception is a case of type I intentionality, object-perception a case of type III intentionality. Some analytic philosophers have contended that both type II and type III intentionality can be reduced to type I intentionality. This would further strengthen my case against lingualism, since it implies that any creature capable of perception is ipso facto capable of fact perception. But the arguments in favour of the reduction are uncompelling. See Glock (2001) . 10.
It should be noted, however, that Davidson's own position doesn't necessarily require this. It is not clear whether he countenances the idea that A acts in the light of belief B and desire D. But in so far as he does, it would seem that acting in the light of B and D requires no more than that A's action is caused in the right way by B and D. There is no need for A to be reflectively aware of B and D. 11.
As regards the conclusion that acting for a reason presupposes the ability to ask for and give reasons, which is linked with a capacity to take charge of our thinking, Hacker is in agreement with Sellarsian lingualists like McDowell (1996, p. 70) and Brandom (e.g., 2010) . But whereas Hacker argues by reference to the ordinary use of mental vocabulary, often regimented by appeal to Aristotelian distinctions, McDowell invokes Kantian ideas about the spontaneity of thought and Brandom contends that intentionality presupposes normativity, and the latter intersubjective practices of score-keeping. I concentrate on Hacker's position, since it is by far the clearest and most convincing presentation of the lingualist case.
